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RecoveRing a FoRgotten PioneeR oF Science 




This paper brings to light the ideas of a pioneering but largely forgotten so-
cial critic, C. E. Ayres. In his first book, Science: The False Messiah (1927), 
which was written in consultation with John Dewey, Ayres advanced a 
forceful and original critique of science and technology. He argued that 
technological change was occurring at a pace that had overwhelmed exist-
ing social institutions, and further claimed that efforts to solve the problem 
by educating citizens about science and technology would prove fruitless. 
The analysis presented in this paper outlines Ayres' key arguments, exam-
ines the mutual influences between Dewey and Ayres, and makes a case that 
many of Ayres' innovative arguments remain surprisingly relevant today.
introduction
In 1926, C. E. Ayres, a young assistant editor of The New Republic, had completed 
a draft of his first book, Science: The False Messiah. His publishers, Bobbs-Merrill, 
were enthusiastic but also somewhat worried—the book, which was a blistering 
critique of the public understanding of science, was engagingly written and emi-
nently readable, but it was also provocative. Bobbs-Merrill were concerned that 
Ayres’ “very saucy” approach might damage sales, especially given that he was a 
complete unknown as far as the general public was concerned; and in order to boost 
Ayres’ credibility and, hence, future sales of the book, they felt that he needed an 
endorsement.1 Ayres thus dutifully set about writing to his friendly acquaintance, 
John Dewey, to whom he had previously shown an early draft of the manuscript. 
In his letter to Dewey, Ayres grumbled a bit, noting that he was not the sort of 
person who liked “sidling up to be patted on the head.”2 But he then asked for the 
endorsement, commenting to Dewey that “the book is your stuff, however wildly 
perverted.”3 Having long been convinced of Ayres’ promise as a scholar, and hav-
ing already given critical but positive feedback on the early chapters that Ayres had 
sent him, Dewey agreed to write some favorable text for the book jacket.4
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Undoubtedly, from Dewey’s perspective, his exchange with Ayres was not 
especially momentous. In the 1920s, at the height of his fame as America’s leading 
public intellectual, Dewey would have received many requests for favors. Yet as I 
will argue below, Ayres’s work did, in fact, have a meaningful impact on Dewey. 
More importantly, though, Ayres’ work was innovative in its own right; although 
it was, in a very significant sense, “Dewey’s stuff,” it was also a pioneering effort. In 
a time when science was coming into its own in the public eye and the philosophy 
of science (let alone the philosophy of social science) was still nascent, Ayres was 
a thoughtful, incisive critic of science and technology. His method, as I will show, 
was a Deweyan one, but Ayres’ interpretation of science and technology is genu-
inely original and substantially less optimistic than that of Dewey. 
This analysis will proceed in the following manner. Given that, even amongst 
Dewey scholars, little is known about Ayres, I will begin by presenting a short 
biographical sketch. This will be followed by an exposition of the core aspects of 
the argument offered in Science: The False Messiah. I will then explain how Ayres’ 
analysis is Deweyan in its overall orientation—specifically, I will argue that Ayres 
adopts three important elements of Dewey’s analysis in Experience and Nature. Fi-
nally, I will speculate about how Ayres’ analysis may have had an effect on Dewey. 
In sum, in addition to exploring the nature of Ayres’ interactions with Dewey, I 
hope to highlight the originality of Ayres’ account of science and technology, which 
remains relevant today and in fact anticipated later developments in the field of 
science studies in a number of important ways.
Who Was c. E. ayrEs?
Ayres was born in Lowell, Massachusetts in 1891, in a strictly religious Baptist fam-
ily. After a brilliant career as an undergraduate at Brown, he first came to Dewey’s 
attention in 1916, when he was a doctoral student in philosophy at the University 
of Chicago. He applied for a dissertation fellowship at Columbia and submitted 
an essay critical of pragmatism. Although his application for the fellowship was 
rejected, Dewey, having been impressed with Ayres’ essay, wrote Ayres a personal 
letter promising to gather donations in order to create a special fellowship for him. 
In the meantime, however, Ayres had already accepted a fellowship at Chicago.5
After Ayres completed his doctorate, he went to work as an assistant professor. 
In brief stints at Amherst and at Reed, Ayres proved to be a successful and popular 
teacher. However, at each institution he was irritated by administrative changes, and 
so he decided to go east to take a job as an associate editor of The New Republic, to 
which he had been an occasional contributor over the years. This was a prestigious 
position, as The New Republic was one of the most influential publications of the time. 
Ayres strengthened his acquaintance with Dewey during this time, writing positive 
reviews of Dewey’s work for the Journal of Philosophy and The New Republic.6 Dewey 
enjoyed Ayres’ work and remarked that he was one of the “best of the younger men.”7 
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Ayres, however, was unhappy with the pressure of his job in New York, and 
decided to retreat to a desert ranch in New Mexico, where he settled down to write 
Science: The False Messiah. He lived happily in the desert for several years (he sent 
Dewey several invitations to visit, touting the horseback riding and hunting, but 
also pointing out that there was “no fishing” in the desert), until an opportunity 
came to return to the academy when the University of Texas at Austin needed a 
replacement historian of economics.8 Ayres soon attained a tenured position and 
stayed in Austin for the rest of his career.9 
Ayres accomplished a great deal during his time in Texas. He was popular 
and renowned for his prowess as a teacher, and he wrote a well-regarded book on 
T.H. Huxley. More importantly, he made substantial contributions to economics. 
He played a role in the construction of the New Deal, and his most important work, 
The Theory of Economic Progress, which was heavily influenced by both Dewey and 
Veblen, helped define a significant economic school of thought known as institution-
alism, which focused on the interactions between technology and institutions, and, 
more broadly, on the social and economic orders that these interactions created.10 
His work in this regard was noted by John Kenneth Galbraith, who read Ayres’ 
books and nominated him as a fellow of the American Economic Association.11 
Despite this success, Ayres’ life in Texas was, at times, far from serene. He 
had never lacked for frankness, and he deeply antagonized some of the less-than-
liberal inhabitants of the Longhorn State with his economic and political views. In 
1951, members of the Texas House of Representatives called Ayres an “educational 
termite,” suggested he be deported, and subsequently voted 130-1 to dismiss him 
from his job.12 Ultimately, the legislature’s efforts were unsuccessful, but these ef-
forts did, if nothing else, testify to Ayres’ tendency to voice what he felt to be incon-
venient truths. As I will show in the next section, this tendency was on full display 
in Science: The False Messiah.
thE argumEnt oF Science: The FalSe MeSSiah
Science: The False Messiah, which was a comprehensive critique of the role that 
science and technology play in American society, begins with a central contention 
that was suggested to Ayres by Dewey. That is, Ayres argued that science had, in 
the popular mind, acquired the character of folklore, which he defined as “a body 
of truth verified by repetition and sanctified by faith.”13 One reason for this faith-
based folk belief was the nature of scientific knowledge; anticipating arguments 
that would later be made popular by Thomas Kuhn14, Ayres pointed out that most 
scientific knowledge was “utterly inaccessible to all but those few who make it their 
profession.”15 A second ground for this folk belief in science stemmed from the 
“popular” aspect of science that was of interest to the public, which Ayres called 
“the lore of science.” Ayres noted that science was capable of accomplishing pow-
erful things—discovering microbes, explaining the workings of the sun—and 
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that as a result of these accomplishments, a large segment of the public had come 
to believe in science. This belief, however, was not based on knowledge, but rather 
on faith—the lore of science, Ayres contended, was revealed to the public in much 
the same manner as Moses revealed the tablets: “Scientists emerge from the awful 
obscurity of their laboratories and announce that these, their decalogues of phys-
ics and biology, are based upon direct observation. We do not doubt them, be-
cause they have been in the laboratories and we have not.”16 Science, in the public 
mind, was a mysterious, quasi-magical process that had the power to bring about 
extraordinary progress, and was, hence, the object of veneration. This argument 
about the folk-belief in science is the root of the title of the book; the population, 
Ayres felt, looked upon science as a “messiah” that would define new realities and 
deliver humanity from its difficulties. 
Having established the faith-based character of the popular understanding 
of science, Ayres then began to construct an argument that highlighted the depen-
dence of science upon technology. Ayres noted that, in the face of criticism, scien-
tists would tend to maintain that their facts were established by direct observation. 
However, as Ayres suggested, the observation wasn’t really direct—it was, rather, 
largely mediated by machines. He commented:
Whenever and wherever a happening can be trained through a machine, 
and that machine converged upon a dial, and that dial marked off into 
standard units, and those units numbered: then and there an exact, sci-
entific, mathematical observation has been made possible.
Ayres then analyzed the example of an oil drop machine, which was used to study 
electrons. The public could not discover the electrons for themselves; they were only 
available for discovery and inspection through the machine. Ayres acknowledged 
that the electron theory seemed to function well; he remarked, “reasoning upon it 
as a basis, various additional happenings have been provoked which thus far ‘fit’ 
the theory.”17 However, Ayres was especially keen to note that the entire theory was 
dependent on particular pieces of machinery:
The theory may or may not be “true.” Electrons may exist, or they may be 
as mythical as the late lamented phlogiston, the supposed inflammable 
constituent of combustibles. The answer will be read in the machines. If 
the machines say no, no it is. . . . Thus, the sum and substance of science 
appears to be that it begins in machinery and ends in machinery.18
Without machinery, contended Ayres, science “would soon soar into the region of 
pure imagination” and become a kind of magic.19 Technology, Ayres claimed, was 
the true power behind the throne of science. Whereas the history of science was 
usually understood in much the same way as the history of nations—namely, as a 
series of achievements brought off by a succession of great men—a more accurate 
understanding, he suggested, would acknowledge the dominant role of machinery. 
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He commented, “Modern science . . . springs from just one source: that is, from in-
struments of precision. That is, from machines.”20 This line of analysis, which was 
popularized by Bruno Latour in the field of science and technology studies almost 
sixty years later21, was unprecedented at the time.
After laying out the case for the dependence of science on machinery and, 
therefore, he thought, the primacy of technology over science, Ayres turned his at-
tention to the effect that machine technology had on society. He noted the ease with 
which certain technologies (he gave the examples of rifles and railroads), which he 
dubbed “technical culture traits”, moved from one society to another. The peoples 
who imported the items appreciated only their usefulness, without appreciating 
how these new technologies might change their culture in unforeseen ways. This 
principle held true, he believed, for all societies, including our own. Ayres com-
mented, “. . . none of us hesitates to install a radio, or to exchange his used car for 
a later model. Why should we? Are not these things obvious improvements?”22
The thoughtless adoption of new technology, Ayres maintained, often led to 
problematic social change. Inventions like the car and the telephone changed the 
way that we live, and these changes were impacting existing social institutions—
the family structure, morality, religion. At the time when he was writing, Ayres 
thought that there was a striking mismatch between social institutions and tech-
nology. Our social institutions were medieval and our technology was modern, 
a mismatch which, he maintained, could not persist. He commented, “it is not 
reasonable to suppose that the institutions of the dark ages will consort through 
an indefinite future with the technology of the machine ages.”23 Medieval social 
institutions were developed in response to a particular way of life, and that way of 
life no longer existed. “Our present civilization is a hybrid,” said Ayres, and “like 
most hybrids, it shows every sign of being unfertile and impermanent.”24 The dis-
solution of our social institutions, Ayres reasoned, was already in progress, and 
although new values and social institutions needed to be developed in response to 
technological change, nothing was being done. 
Ayres was also intensely critical of the arguments made by scientists con-
cerning the compatibility of science and religion, and he devoted a significant 
portion of the book to analyzing this thesis.25 In this section, he launched a num-
ber of blistering critiques, the two most notable being his attack on the attempt to 
make religion scientific and his critique of the claim that science still leaves room 
for faith. As far as the effort to scientize religion was concerned, Ayres appraised it 
as an ill-fated attempt to combine utterly different explanatory systems. Religious 
folklore, he maintained, did not lend itself to scientific analysis, and the reverse 
was true as well. Ayres commented drily, “Such are the conditions of our life that it 
has become necessary to gage the horsepower of the Omnipotent.”26 The claim that 
science somehow left the ground open for religious belief (“There’s so much that we 
don’t know!”) also left Ayres skeptical. Although he granted that this position was 
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popular amongst scientists, he noted that “scientists had the same body of folkways 
and folklore as everyone else” and had also duly “given hostages to polite society” 
(what would Aunt Mabel think?). Ayres agreed that science was provisional and 
conjectural, but this did not warrant the conclusion that a space had been cleared 
for faith. He remarked, “Incomplete science no doubt is, but not in such a fash-
ion as to lead any one to go behind it to an antique and alien ceremonial.”27 The 
mysteries of the atom were deep indeed, Ayres conceded, and there was much to 
be learned about them, but that did not mean that there was any space for divine 
caprice within whichever new models of the atom emerged. 
One possible consolation of the decimation of religion by science could be 
that new scientific discoveries and technologies would emerge which would help 
address the social problems brought about by technological change. This messi-
anic belief in science, Ayres felt, was widespread, and he set out to ridicule it. Thus 
he commented, “We find it very easy to believe that science will provide. Our oil 
may be exhausted: science will find another way; our population may multiply like 
flies: science will find food.”28 Ayres thought that this messianic faith was at least 
partly based on another problematic aspect of scientific folklore: the Great Man 
theory of science. There was a widespread view that a great genius, a conquering 
hero of science and technology, could suddenly emerge to save the day. Ayres be-
lieved that this image was at least partly due to press accounts that had helped to 
create this illusion, and he devoted some space to analyzing a popular book that 
he believed exemplified this problem, Paul de Kruif ’s The Microbe Hunters. Ayres 
began by examining the example of Lazzaro Spallanzani, a bacteriologist that de 
Kruif exalted for his dedication to undertaking experiments that would falsify his 
hypothesis. Ayres mocked the proposition that verification implied devotion at 
some length, comparing scientists to bookkeepers, who, “so great is their devo-
tion to the truth,” that they double-check their figures to make sure that they are 
correct.29 Ayres quipped, “In doing as he did, [Spallanzani] behaved exactly as any 
sane man or child above the age of five would have behaved. . . . He makes sure that 
the lid is on the jam jar before he says, ‘I didn’t do it.’”30 
Having presumably disposed of Spallanzani, Ayres proceeded to dismantle 
de Kruif ’s heroic account of Paul Ehrlich, the discoverer of the cure for syphilis. 
Ehrlich had been working on organic dyes that had the unique capacity to stain 
certain microbes and not others. From this datum, Ehrlich conceived of the pos-
sibility that these dyes could be used to selectively poison microbes. He tested this 
idea successfully with a large trypanosome, which he later realized was similar to 
the syphilis bacterium. Ehrlich was quite modest about this discovery, attributing 
it largely to luck. De Kruif had vaunted Ehrlich for this; according to De Kruif ’s 
analysis, this modesty was only to be expected of a great hero of science. Ayres, 
however, maintained that Ehrlich’s luck attribution was largely correct. Ehrlich was 
an unusually able and thoughtful scientist, maintained Ayres, but he was fortunate 
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in that he happened to be working on a particular puzzle that had an unanticipated 
application. Most apparently great discoveries, maintained Ayres, came about in 
this seemingly haphazard way. Once again anticipating Thomas Kuhn31, Ayres 
suggested that key discoveries were generally not a product of heroic thinking in 
the usual meaning of the term; they were, rather, part and parcel of some kind of 
existing tradition of technological or scientific inquiry. 
An obvious corollary of this idea was the proposition that science and tech-
nology did not produce discoveries on command. In order to support this argu-
ment, Ayres turned to the example of cancer. He noted that although there was a 
great interest in curing cancer, “so much so indeed . . . that to get a free education 
or to prosecute a problem you have only to show your great interest in cancer and 
the rest is added unto you,”32 there had been very little progress made. The problem 
was, to borrow a Rumsfeldian phrase, that cancer was an unknown unknown—
scientists simply did not know where to begin the inquiry. Ayres commented, “Just 
what it is that we do not know or can not do, the lack of which sets at naught all 
our efforts . . .no one can state. Consequently we are quite at a loss.”33 Science was 
effective at solving well-defined puzzles where the unknowns were known, but 
could not deliver solutions to ill-defined problems on demand, regardless of how 
pressing those problems were. 
 From this analysis, Ayres concluded, perhaps hastily, that scientific and 
technological change were beyond effective human control:
Inventions come because they are possible, not because they are wanted, 
and scientific inventions come in precisely the same fashion; and in the 
case of every invention its ulterior effects are what nobody has wanted and 
most people would acutely dread. Science as a whole will surely go on to 
the discovery of things we little dream of; and the effects of those discov-
eries will be such changes in human life and civilization as we can hardly 
tolerate to think about. To bring about one of these inventions in answer 
to our prayers is only just short of impossible. To check the general flood 
is equally impossible. In all the affairs of men, science included, the wind 
bloweth where it listeth.34
Ayres, who had long since repudiated his Protestant upbringing, was nonetheless 
fond of Biblical references, and the end of this paragraph is a reference to John 3:8: 
“The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst 
not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth.”35 Clearly, Ayres’ outlook on the 
future of science and technology was not particularly sanguine.
Yet even given this grim analysis, one might be tempted to think that edu-
cation might extricate the public from these misconceptions—if one could, for 
example, teach citizens the scientific method (Ayres may have had Dewey in mind 
here), perhaps people would be less credulous about science. Ayres, however, con-
cluded Science: The False Messiah on a pessimistic note by suggesting that it was 
E&C    EduCation and CulturE
166    david i. Waddington
hopeless to try to educate people to think scientifically. Civilization was necessarily 
grounded in habit, he felt, and it was therefore unrealistic to expect people to make 
a habit of not having habits—in other words, a habit of being experimental. The 
American people, Ayres felt, could only become a scientific people “in the sense in 
which we are now a Christian people.”36 In other words, a certain amount of hand 
waving about the importance of critical thinking was attainable, and a generalized 
educational endorsement might even be possible, but ultimately, the average person
sends down roots into the coarse and fetid soil of common tradition, stan-
dardized, institutionalized, accumulated from the dropping of countless 
generations of similarly stupid, obvious, and standardized Children of 
the Lord. . . . To limpid intelligence the world is a mud-bank of deceit on 
which crawls the human race gorging itself on self-deceit.37
From this, one of the parting shots in the book, it’s quite evident that Ayres was not 
longing for the Elysian fields of educational reform in order to refashion America 
into a science-savvy nation.
ayrEs’ dEWEyan insPiration
Ayres is an elegant writer, and although he had an occasional tendency toward the 
florid, the key elements of his critique of science and technology are clear. What 
is substantially less clear, however, is how this argument is, as Ayres suggested to 
Dewey, “your stuff, however wildly perverted.” As noted above, Ayres thanked 
Dewey for the suggestion that science should be thought of as a form of folklore, 
and this obviously became a key element of Ayres’ argument, but beyond this, there 
is no clear elaboration in any of the letters on how Ayres believed he was drawing 
upon Dewey.
One legitimate possible counterinterpretation here is to suggest that there 
isn’t much of a connection at all between Ayres’ project and “Dewey’s stuff.” Ayres 
needed an endorsement, and to have it, he might have attempted to curry favor 
with Dewey by suggesting that his project was in the Deweyan spirit. Given Ayres’ 
general temperament, however, I believe that this interpretation is extremely un-
likely. Unlike Dewey, who generally did not adopt an agent provocateur role when 
writing book reviews, Ayres had a tendency toward frankness in his New Republic 
book reviews—for example, he titled one extremely negative review, “For Hammock 
Consumption Only.”38 Furthermore, as the Texas legislature vote would appear to 
indicate, he did not moderate his opinions in later life. Finally, long after Ayres 
had lost contact with Dewey and had ceased to need Dewey’s help in his career, he 
nonetheless continued to write laudatory articles for The New Republic about Dewey. 
Given that this “favor currying” interpretation is unlikely, a reasonable place 
to look for evidence of possible links between Dewey and Ayres is in Experience and 
Nature (1925), which was published just a year prior to Ayres’ book. The evidence 
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to be found is substantial; there are three ways in which Ayres can be said to adopt 
Deweyan positions: first, he adopts Dewey’s empirical method; second, he hews 
to Dewey’s non-foundationalist analysis of science; and finally, Science: The False 
Messiah is also a paradigmatic example of the kind of criticism that Dewey calls for 
in the final chapter of Experience and Nature. Although Ayres’ conclusions about 
science diverge substantially from Dewey’s more optimistic evaluation, Ayres is 
Deweyan in his general orientation.
This is especially clear from Chapter One of Experience and Nature, in 
which Dewey offered a bold, clear statement of his overall approach. His “empiri-
cal method” was a call to take experience seriously as a primary philosophical da-
tum. He commented, “the very meaning and purport of empirical method is that 
things are to be studied on their own account, so as to find out what is revealed 
when they are experienced.”39 Philosophers had a tendency to identify various other 
sources—including underlying material substance, sense data, or ideal being—as 
being somehow primary, but this was a false view, Dewey suggested. All of these 
supposed primary sources were more and less helpful after-the-fact reconstructions 
of experience and were, hence, secondary. He remarked, “As a natural history of 
mind, this notion is wholly mythological. All knowing and effort to know starts 
from some belief, some received and asserted meaning.”40 In Chapter One, Dewey 
further claimed that the job of empirical method was to provide a genealogy and 
analysis of the state of belief. He commented, “empirical method points out when 
and where and how things . . . have been arrived at. It places before others a map 
of the road that has been travelled.”41 
Arguably, it is precisely this sort of method that scholars like Michel Fou-
cault would later successfully pursue with books like The Birth of the Clinic and 
Discipline and Punish.42 But it was also Ayres’ method in Science: The False Mes-
siah. Instead of lionizing the Great Heroes of science or eulogizing its miraculous 
capacity to deliver the goods that civilization needed, Ayres attempted to throw 
open the laboratory doors and describe the way in which scientists functioned 
on an everyday basis (compare his comments on the nature of discovery and his 
analysis of the dependence of science upon technology). Instead of emphasizing its 
compatibility with religion or decrying it as an agent of destruction of traditional 
values (both of which were popular approaches at the time), Ayres attempted to 
draw a skeptical but accurate map of both the nature of popular belief in science as 
well as the effects that science and technology were having upon culture. By doing 
this, he was performing what Dewey referred to as the “analytic dismemberment 
and synthetic reconstruction of experience,” applied specifically to the popular 
understanding of science.43
The second way in which Ayres took a Deweyan position can be seen in his 
non-foundationalist understanding of science. In a 1927 New Republic article, “Back 
to Locke,” Ayres commented,
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In other words, when scientists are doctoring us, or dieting us, or housing 
us, or transporting us by the magic of their mechanical control, they have 
our confidence. But when they begin to tell us what we are, we are imme-
diately skeptical. . . . As a result, some of us—largely at the instigation of 
John Dewey—have taken to calling science a technique. It is an instrument 
for doing certain things.44 
In the second chapter of Science: The False Messiah, “The Lust for Truth,” Ayres 
had laid out a roughly similar position at greater length. Science was a powerful 
tool, he conceded, especially when combined with machine technology, but that 
did not imply that science was identical with knowledge, truth, or reality. In terms 
of everyday lived experience, Ayres felt, science was largely useless, and only be-
came relevant through its manifestations in terms of machine technologies. Ayres 
pronounced acerbically, “Science is a contribution to knowledge only if we mean 
by knowledge, science.”45
Dewey’s position in Experience and Nature is substantially more refined and 
carefully justified than the view that Ayres sketched out, but there are substantial 
similarities between the two views. In Chapter Four of the book, in which Dewey 
laid out his conception of science, he steadfastly resisted the temptation to declare 
that mathematico-mechanical objects (the objects of physics) were constitutive 
of reality, and suggested instead that the entire problem of ultimate realities was 
wrongheaded. He argued that once we stopped thinking in this foundationalist 
manner and began thinking of the objects of science simply as useful tools to effect 
certain kinds of results, we could escape from a number of important philosophical 
problems, most notably the tendency to crown either phenomenal appearances or 
underlying scientific objects with the mantle of ultimate reality.46 Although Dewey 
was much more optimistic about science than Ayres, and would have certainly dis-
agreed with Ayres’ contention about the lack of usefulness of scientific knowledge, 
he certainly agreed with Ayres’ view that scientific knowledge was knowledge for 
science rather than knowledge tout court.
A final way in which Ayres can be seen to be Deweyan in his approach is in 
his embrace of Dewey’s call for philosophical critique. In the final chapter of Ex-
perience and Nature, Dewey explained that our lives are full of things that seem 
immediately good to us. All things, from a fast food meal to a Cezanne painting 
are, insofar as we enjoy them, immediate goods. Dewey further maintained that 
these goods are, at least in the moment, equal in terms of their goodness; only upon 
reflection could we differentiate between them and value them appropriately, and 
this reflection is what constitutes criticism.47 When this criticism was carried out 
carefully and systematically, or, to use Dewey’s terms, “in the grand manner,” it was 
philosophy, and Dewey suggested that science should be one of the key targets of 
critical reflection: “Positive concrete goods of science, art, and social companion-
ship are the basic subject-matter of philosophy as criticism . . .”48 Ayres had set out 
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to offer some criticism that would clarify the value of science, and as I will make 
clear in the next section, although this criticism was caustic (as is clear from the 
summary of Ayres’ argument above), Dewey’s reaction to it was surprisingly posi-
tive, and it may have even had an effect on his subsequent thinking about science 
and technology.
ayrEs’ EFFEct on dEWEy
As I indicated above, it is evident that Ayres was a pioneering STS thinker and that 
he was powerfully affected by Dewey’s work. In this section, I will show how the 
vector of influence also points the opposite way--from Ayres to Dewey--although 
the strength of the influence is weaker and some of the connections are more specu-
lative.49 I will begin by detailing the direct, tangible ways in which Ayres affected 
Dewey over the years, and then I will offer a broader but more speculative connec-
tion between the two thinkers.
Dewey’s initial reaction to Ayres is largely detailed in a favorable review of 
Science: The False Messiah that he wrote for The New Republic. In his introductory 
remarks, he commented:
Rarely in one book have so many glittering bubbles been so deftly and, 
in style, so delightfully pricked. Indeed, at times the brilliance and wit of 
form almost conceal the solidity of substance underneath.50 
In keeping with his usual reviewing style, after having given a synopsis of the book, 
Dewey offered a more detailed evaluation. Dewey did not see “how any thoughtful 
person [could] demur” at the main propositions of the book, which included Ayres’ 
characterization of technology and its effects on society.51 In addition, Dewey stated 
that he felt that science, in and of itself, was not the answer to human problems. 
Dewey interpreted Ayres as believing that science “delivered only means” and left 
outstanding the critical question of how those problems should be solved. In other 
words, he validated Ayres as mirroring his own views on these issues.52 
However, Dewey was keen to dispute Ayres on one particular point: the pos-
sibility and desirability of educating all people to think more scientifically. Those 
who are familiar with Dewey’s educational work will know that Ayres’ arguments 
are completely opposed to Dewey’s educational prescriptions. The primary purpose 
of Deweyan education was to create citizens who were effective thinkers and actors, 
and this effectiveness was to stem, at least in part, from a robust understanding of 
science and technology; one of the primary goals of Dewey’s system of education 
through occupations was to instill this understanding.53 As noted above, Ayres had 
been extremely pessimistic about this possibility, and Dewey certainly disagreed 
with this sentiment. Although he was willing to concede that many people would 
not be able to understand science in its full technical sense, he felt that it was pos-
sible to instill a scientific attitude in people. He remarked:
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But there are generic attitudes, like those of facing facts, of analysis, of re-
ceiving conclusions hypothetically, which are radically opposed to the dis-
positions which have supported the folk-lore of the past. It is no easy task to 
incorporate these newer dispositions . . . but any implication that the task is 
hopeless implies an estimate of human nature which paralyzes human effort.54
In sum, although Dewey felt that Ayres’ book served as a useful corrective to a na-
ively optimistic faith in science and technology, he was not prepared to endorse 
the full range of Ayres’ pessimism. 
Clearly, however, he did regard Ayres’ book seriously, as he subsequently proved 
when he drew upon it and referred directly to it in The Public and Its Problems (1927).55 
In this book, Dewey was, among other things, working toward a more thorough 
analysis of the problem of scientific understanding. Dewey explained that he wanted 
the results of science (especially social science) to be made fully accessible to the pub-
lic. The scientific enterprise, he felt, had made many discoveries that were relevant to 
human life, and these discoveries were changing, or had the potential to change, the 
way life was lived. However, the public did not have an adequate understanding of 
either science or technology. Dewey reprised Ayres’ analysis here, commenting, “For 
most men . . . science is a mystery in the hands of initiates.”56 He then suggested that 
if a better public understanding of science and technology could be effected, it would 
serve to address some of the concerns raised by Ayres. Science might not “provide” 
for the public, but a better understanding of science and technology would, at least, 
allow the public to “use and control its manifestations” to some extent rather than 
merely “undergo the consequences.”57 Diffusion of the results of science, especially 
the results of social science, might allow for a more rational approach to social prob-
lems, and make the public less susceptible to attempts to manipulate public opinion. 
A better public understanding of science and technology might also lead in 
the direction of a more egalitarian, freer society. As things stood, Dewey felt that 
scientific knowledge was not applied by the whole public to society, but rather was 
inflicted on working people by the rich. He remarked: “At present, the application 
of physical science is rather to human concerns than in them. That is, it is external, 
made in the interests of its consequences for a possessing and acquisitive class.”58 
This appropriation of science by the rich had wreaked terrible damage:
Knowledge . . . has played its part in generating enslavement of men, women and 
children in factories in which they are animated machines to tend inanimate 
machines. It has maintained sordid slums, flurried and discontented careers, 
grinding poverty and luxurious wealth . . . Man, a child in understanding of 
himself, has placed in his hands physical tools of incalculable power. He plays 
with them like a child, and whether they work harm or good is largely a matter 
of accident. The instrumentality becomes a master and works fatally as if pos-
sessed of a will of its own—not because it has a will but because man has not.59 
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Dewey clearly felt that Ayres had described the problem of technology correctly, 
which is why he remarked, “The instrumentality . . . works fatally as if possessed 
of a will of its own.” However, he obviously did not feel, as Ayres did, that it was an 
unsolvable problem. Dewey thought that the public might one day be able to re-
appropriate scientific and technological knowledge and exert itself self-consciously 
and knowledgeably upon the scientific and technological apparatus. This re-appro-
priation would imply a more free society in two ways: it would free people from 
their mechanical bondage, and it would bring about a society that was capable of 
self-consciously directing its own path. 
Beyond 1927, limited textual evidence linking Dewey and Ayres means that 
it is difficult to the gauge the precise impact of Ayres’ work on Dewey.60 There is 
some evidence, however, which points towards an enduring connection between 
the two thinkers. In 1943, for example, Dewey acknowledged an important con-
tribution that Ayres had made to the understanding of science:
Dr. Clarence Ayres, as far as I am aware, was the first one explicitly to call 
science a mode of technology. It is probable that I might have avoided a 
considerable amount of misunderstanding if I had systematically used 
“technology” instead of “instrumentalism” in connection with the view 
I put forth regarding the distinctive quality of science as knowledge.61
This pronouncement62 is a clear testament to the enduring influence of Ayres’ 
double view that science is itself a technology and that that science is deeply de-
pendent upon machine technology. As Hickman points out and as Ayres himself 
had acknowledged in his 1927 New Republic review, “Back to Locke,” the former 
aspect of Ayres’ view was derived from Dewey, and so this granting of credit was 
generous on Dewey’s part. 
An additional marker of Ayres’ lingering influence is that Dewey continued 
to be a partisan of Ayres’ work long after their initial 1927 correspondence. After 
Henry Hazlitt (a Wall Street Journal editorialist and prominent proponent of the 
Austrian School of economics63) submitted a negative review of Ayres’ Theory of 
Economic Progress to the Saturday Review, Dewey attacked Hazlitt’s critique, sug-
gesting that Hazlitt had distorted Ayres’ argument completely in order to demolish 
a straw-man version of it. Dewey was blunt in his condemnation: “The thesis of my 
comment is that nowhere in the notice does Mr. Hazlitt state either the issue, Mr. 
Ayres’ position regarding it, or the reasons given by the latter for taking it.”64 At 
this stage in his career, Ayres was well established; he did not need Dewey’s help, 
nor did Dewey need to give it. Evidently, Dewey still felt that Ayres was someone 
worth supporting. 
Clearly, Dewey and Ayres had a number of meaningful interactions, and there 
is ample evidence that Dewey was a strong supporter of Ayres’ work. Yet the ques-
tion of whether Ayres had a lasting influence on the content of Dewey’s work remains 
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outstanding. Here, our conjectures must be framed more tentatively. In the years 
following his initial interactions with Ayres, it appears that Dewey had a heightened 
concern for dealing with the question of science and technology. In Individualism: 
Old and New (1930), Dewey quoted Ayres directly and, once again, reprised Ayres’ 
suggestion that scientific and technological progress were spinning out of control. 
Resolving the question of control over technology, Dewey indicated, was a crucial 
precondition to the development of a more cooperative society that would be char-
acterized by both new, more corporate forms of individualism and stronger notions 
of community.65 He offered a similar, briefer analysis some years later in Freedom 
and Culture (1939), in which he noted that although technological progress had de-
stroyed old values, our culture had failed to propose new, more appropriate values.66 
This position is, one should note, in contrast to some of Dewey’s earlier writ-
ings, in which he adopted a very optimistic tone in his pronouncements about sci-
ence and technology. In his early work especially, Dewey had a quasi-religious faith 
in the power of science—in “Christianity and Democracy” (1893), an early essay, 
he spoke of it as a “revelation” that gradually uncovered the unity of all things, and 
he suggested that democracy was connected with “the machinery of telegraph and 
locomotive for distributing truth.”67 In a later essay the same year, he upbraided 
French historian Ernest Renan for having lost faith in science, and expressed his 
belief that social science would advance to the point where it would guide daily 
practice and decision making.68 
This fervent optimism had dissipated by the time Dewey wrote Experience 
and Nature, where he commented on the existence of an unduly “abject” admira-
tion for science and its fruits.69 Given that Experience and Nature was published 
before Dewey had read Ayres’ draft, one cannot say that reading Ayres was the sole 
cause of Dewey’s diminishing optimism about science and technology. Yet Dewey’s 
positive response to Ayres’ work, and the number of times he subsequently referred 
to Ayres when speaking cautiously about technology, point up the possibility that 
reading Science: The False Messiah had a substantial lasting effect on Dewey’s 
thinking about technology. Beyond this, it also highlights the fact that Dewey was 
far from being a naïve optimist about science and technology, contrary to the al-
legations made by some of his critics.70 Dewey’s interaction with Ayres gave him 
access to criticism of science and technology that cut deeply and powerfully, and 
the evidence indicates that he was very receptive to this critique. 
conclusion
Albert Barnes, in a 1927 letter to Dewey, suggested that Science: The False Messiah 
would make Ayres famous.71 Evidently, and perhaps unfortunately, he was wrong: 
In 2012, as I write this essay, Ayres’ star has long since faded from the academic 
scene. His works are out of print, and have mostly been forgotten but for a few Dewey 
scholars and historians of economics. Yet in offering this exposition of one of Ayres’ 
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works and an explanation of the reciprocal influences between him and Dewey, I 
have been making the case that he deserves substantially more attention than he 
has gotten. His position on science and technology was radical and innovative in 
1927 and struck Dewey forcefully. In the 1920s, there was no organized field of sci-
ence, technology, and society (STS) scholarship; Ayres was a pioneer in a field that 
would not emerge until the 1960s and 1970s. Given that the field has come into its 
own, many of Ayres’ arguments have now become conventional wisdom amongst 
STS scholars—for example, Ayres’ core point that there is a prevailing popular 
folklore about science has become generally accepted. There is, however, still a lot 
of life in some of his other arguments, especially his contention that science begins 
and ends in machines, and with particular reference to his example of the oil drop 
machine examined above. As I have indicated, sociologist of knowledge Bruno La-
tour has taken up a position that bears a family resemblance to Ayres’ suggestions 
here, a position which is still controversial today. Ayres’ and Dewey’s contentions 
about the non-foundational nature of scientific truth are also very much live issues. 
Notably, some of the questions that concerned Ayres are also alive and well 
in education. Although Ayres can’t be connected directly to contemporary edu-
cational developments, science education is beginning to move in a direction that 
Ayres would appreciate. The types of STS issues that preoccupied Ayres have been 
on the rise in science education for the last 30 years and are now gradually being 
accepted (albeit not without substantial resistance72) in textbooks and curricula.73 
In concert with this development, the old definition of science literacy, in which 
the core educational goal was to develop an introductory-level understanding of 
several scientific disciplines, is being replaced by a new definition that focuses on 
connecting scientific knowledge to situations that citizens might actually encounter. 
As Noah Feinstein has noted, the old vision of science literacy produced “marginal 
insiders,” who understood very little of the core knowledge that the conventional 
definition prescribed, while the new definition holds the promise of producing 
“competent outsiders” who, while not possessing insider-level expertise, can at least 
navigate the seas of scientific information when necessary.74 Granted, even this fairly 
modest conception of science literacy might generate an acerbic pronouncement 
or two from Ayres, but he would at least be more enthused about this new move-
ment than its predecessors in science and technology education, which combined 
naively triumphalist accounts of science with ineffective education for citizens. 
Perhaps the most impressive aspect of Ayres’ work, though, is how well it has 
stood the test of time. How many books written about science and technology in 2011 
will still be worth reading 85 years in the future? I suspect that the vast majority of 
these books will seem, to the denizens of the year 2095, quaintly comic. Pessimistic 
and corrosive though it is, Ayres’ analysis has retained its critical relevance—there is 
almost none of it that fails to apply to the situations we face today. Take, for example, 
the belief that science will provide. Today, we find ourselves at the brink of a possibly 
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catastrophic period of global warming. Yet somehow we are not particularly anxious, 
and this may at least be partially attributable to a faith that science and technology 
will descend, deus ex machina, and provide us with a solution to our ills. Ayres’ can-
cer example is especially instructive in this regard; although the situation is substan-
tially improved in 2011, his 1927 analysis largely applies. We have been desperately 
longing for a cure for cancer since Ayres’ time, but despite some significant progress 
and a great deal of hopeful fund-raising and grant-generating handwaving, science 
has mostly failed to deliver on its promises in this regard.
Ayres’ call for us to reflect on the value of science and technology thus re-
mains current. The gospel of science (and the newer gospel of technology) continues 
to win converts and, as Ayres would have predicted, these converts are not always 
particularly thoughtful in their faith. Now, more than ever, we need to embrace 
the Deweyan imperative to examine the value of science and technology critically. 
In ways that are more powerful and pervasive than most of the other goods that 
present themselves to us, science and technology are immediate goods that make 
extraordinary promises. In other words, the prophets of the new creed have never 
been slicker, and popular faith, despite occasional eruptions of misplaced skepti-
cism (e.g., climate change deniers), remains strong. Were he still around today, the 
Ayres of 1927 would doubtlessly be holed up in a Social Studies of Science Depart-
ment, suggesting that it was high time for a few heretics to emerge.
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21. To someone who is not familiar with the discipline of science studies, Ayres’ conten-
tions about the dependence of science on machinery may seem strange and/or irrelevant. 
Why would it matter if machines mediate the facts of science? As it turns out, Ayres’ line of 
thinking here is similar to the program of a thinker who has been hailed, in some circles, 
as revolutionary: Bruno Latour. In their most famous work, Laboratory Life, Bruno La-
tour and Steve Woolgar maintain a thesis about the dependence of science on machinery. 
Machines, they suggest, are used not merely to discover facts, but to construct them. See 
Laboratory Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). In a later book, Science in 
Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), Latour contends that the facts 
of science are extremely fragile and require an extensive mechanical infrastructure to sup-
port them. Latour comments: 
No one has ever observed a fact, a theory or a machine that could survive outside 
of the networks that gave birth to them. Still more fragile than termites, facts and 
machines can travel along extended galleries, but they cannot survive one minute 
in this famous and mythical ‘out-thereness’ so vaunted by philosophers of science.” 
(Latour, Science in Action, 248) 
Thus, outside of the mechanical network of laboratories, there are no electrons. Although 
it is not clear that Ayres would support a claim this radical, Latour would agree with Ayres 
that, absent the support of machines, science drifts off into the realm of the magical. Machine 
technology is more than just the handmaiden of science; at the very least, science is deeply 
interwoven with and dependent upon machine technology to construct its facts.
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23. Ibid., 87.
24. Ibid., 87.
25. Given the title of the book, one might suppose that Ayres is friendly towards reli-
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60. Ayres’ work also had a small effect on Dewey’s private life, as it caused substantial upset to 
Dewey’s eccentric longtime correspondent, retired naval officer Scudder Klyce. Klyce, who was 
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never one to mince words, and who was already angry at Ayres for having failed to respond to a 
negative review of Science: The False Messiah that he had written some months earlier, suggested 
that Ayres’ book showed that Ayres was “an agnostic” and “a failure.” Ayres’ agnosticism, how-
ever, was only the tip of the iceberg—Klyce was also furious that Ayres had, in The New Repub-
lic, interpreted Dewey as viewing science as a technique, which Klyce viewed as being contrary 
to his own views. He demanded that Dewey repudiate Ayres’ interpretation—he concluded his 
letter to Dewey as follows: “For if you accept as sound this article by Ayres, then all I have to say 
is that you are a menace to the welfare of the human race. It is just that bad” (Scudder Klyce to 
John Dewey, 1927.07.27, Dewey Correspondence). Dewey, however, refused to concede to Klyce’s 
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sulted in Klyce’s unauthorized publication of his correspondence with Dewey.
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